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AppearanceA
are
important

IN BRIEF
Is Independence in the Eye of the Beholder?
Tlie appearance of independence is an
important facet of the regulation of auditor
independence. The authors conducted a
research study to gauge how some financial
statement users—loan officers—view and
make decisions based on loan proposals that
present various types of relationsliips between
the applicant, the auditor that performs the
external audit, and the auditor that performs
the internal audit function (whether performed in-house or otitsourced to the hypothetical loan applicant's external auditor).
The results are insightful: The closer the
relationship between the external auditor and
the audit client, the higher the perception of
inappropriateness, and the less likely the loan
officer is to approve the application. The findings support the current direction of discussion about auditor independence rules, and
the authors draw thoughtful conclusions
about their study's wider implications.
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Outsourced
Internal Audit Services
and the Perception
of Auditor
Independence
BY MARSHALL A. GEIGER,
D. JORDAN LOWE, AND
KURT j . PAN Y

In the early
1990s, CPA firms began to view internal
audit activities as an expanding service for
both new and existing clients. Many large
CPA firms had created their own business
units to market and deliver internal audit outsourcing services. Many believe such services are a natural extension of the external
auditor's work (eg., calling it extended
audit services') and believe that the external
auditors' performance of internal audit-related activities may improve audit quality by
providing external auditors with considerable knowledge about the client, its operations, and its industry: The greater the external auditor's insight into the client, the better
its ability to understand business transactions
and identify key audit risks.
As CPA firms became more involved in
internal audit outsourcing, independence

The findings indicate that the type of
internal audit outsourcing relationship
affects financial statement users' perceptions and decisions.
issues arose over the propriety of performing both the internal and external
audit functions for the same company.
The SEC has expressed concern that this
relationsliip may create a mutuality of
interests" between the auditor and their
client that could impair independence,
Tlie argument is that auditors are at risk
of acting too much like company management, which could impair tlieir independence or at least the appearance of
independence. Accordingly, in 2000 the
SEC passed regulations to limit the
amount of these services external auditors can render to financial statement
audit clients. In the wake of the Etiron
investigation, the AICPA has called for a
moratorium on these services for publicly traded audit clients.
The Institute of Internal Auditors
(HA) believes that a clear conflict of
interest exists when the CPA firm that
performs the external audit also has primary responsibility for the internal
audit. The IIA asserts that under such
an arrangement the CPA firm bect)mes
an indirect advocate of management
assertions in the financial statements,
thus possibly predisposing external
auditors to serve corporate management rather than shareholders and
investors.
The A1(;PA explicitly addressed this
issue and set forth guidelines in its
Interpretation 101-13 under Rule of
Conduct 101, Extended Audit Services.
This interpretation supercedes the
AICPA s Ethics RuUng 97 and sets forth
parameters as to when and how such
internal control-related services are
allowable under professional standards
while maintaining the external audi
tor s independence. The interpretation
states that independence would not be
considered impaired if "the member or
his or her firm does not act or does not
appear ro act iii a capacity equivalent to
a member of client management or as
an employee."

Despite these guidelines and assurances, regulators remain concerned
that the AICPA's guidance will not alleviate potential independence problems; these fears have been fueled by
high-profile accoimting failures, including the Enron bankruptcy. Some suggest creating an additional safeguard to
require a distinct separation of the individuals within the CPA firm that perform the external and internal audit
work. Separating the CPA engagement
teams that provide internal audit services from those that provide financial
statement audits may strengthen public
confidence that the (independent)
external audit function is not influenced by other relationships. While
some communication between these
two groups is inevitable and necessary,
financial statement users may perceive
that this team approach does not
impair auditor independence. In fact,
some firms (e.g., Deloitte & Touche)
had already implemented this separate
teams" approach.

The Study
Little evidence exists as to whether
financial statement users believe that
auditor independence orfinancialstatement reliability is jeopardized when the
external auditors are engaged to perform internal audit activities. The
objective of this study is to begin to
provide the profession, and regulators,
with some empirical evidence. The
study examined financial statement
users' perceptions and reactions to
varying types of internal audit relationships between CPAs and their audit and
non-audit clients.
Participants.
Eight hundred loan
officers from across the United States
were randomly selected from a commercially obtained mailing list. Each
loan officer was mailed the appropriate
case, and a second request for response
mailed approximately three weeks

later. A total of l45 usable responses
were received. The respondents had an
average of 17 years of loan experience.
Case materials. We mailed each
participant a set of materials consisting
of a cover letter, a brief loan-case scenario, financial statements with selected ratios, and a questionnaire. The task
required the loan officers to review a
loan application (from a regional grocery store), evaluate external auditor
independence, assess the reliability of
the historical financial statements, and
make a loan decision. The financial
information included three years" statements of earnings, statements of financial position, and summaries of cash
flows, and one year's forecasted statements. The purpose of the loan was to
finance expansion into new locations.
The materials also included a brief summary of company management. The
financial statements were constructed
using industry data reported by Robert
Morris Associates, The financial information was depicted as slightly below
industry averages, to allow some uncertainty about whether a loan should be
granted.
The loan proposals were identical
except for the outsourcing arrangement. Four different outsourcing
arrangements were used:
• Not outsourced: The company's
internal auditors performed the internal
audit function. This group served as a
baseline.
• Outsourced^management functions: The internal audit ftmction was
outsourced to the company's external
auditor. In addition, the CPA firm also
performed some of the company's management functions (not allowed under
Interpretation 101-13 under Rule of
Conduct 101).
• Outsourced—same personnel: The
internal audit function was outsourced
to the company's external auditor. The
same personnel that performed the
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the type of internal audit outsotircing
relationship affects these perceptions
and decisions. We investigated these
findings further in terms of two related
issues:
External auditor involvement
with management functions. Statistical comparisons revealed that the management functions group had significantly lower ratings of auditor indepenCa5e Questions
The AICPA suggests that indepen- dence than the not outsourced group
dence-related research should analyze (p<.05). Furthermore, the management
issues related to confidence in the inde- functions group had the lowest mean
pendence of auditors, perceptions of responses to auditor independence
financial statement accuracy and relia- (5.56), unintentional misstatements
bility, and discretionary decision mak- (5.93). and intentional misstatements
ing by financial statement users. The (6.48) as compared to all of the other
grotips. A significantly lower percentsurvey asked the following questions:
• "How confident are you that the age of loan officers granted the loan to
CPAs are independent in performing the management functions group (26%)
than the not-outsourced group (50%).
the audit?"
Taken
together, these findings indicate
• "How confident are you that the
that
financial
statement users have
audited financial statements are free
decidedly
negative
reactions when the
from unintentional (alternatively, intenexternal auditor assumes management
tional) misstatements or omissions?"
functions in the performance of the
Participants responded on an 11outsourced internal audit. These results
point scale ranging from 0 (no confisupport current professional and regudence) to 10 (extreme confidence).
latory standards that specifically proFinally, loan officers were asked to
make a recommendation to approve or
reject on the loan application.

external audit also performed the outsourced internal audit activities.
• Outsourced—different personnel:
The internal audit function was outsourced to the company's external
auditor. Different personnel within the
firm performed the external audit and
the outsourced internal audit activities.

Results

We examined whether the outsourcing of the internal audit function to the
company's external auditor affected
this group of financial statement users'
perceptions of auditor independence
and financial statement reliability, in
the context of making a loan decision.
The perception of independence was
significantly different across the three
outsourcing arrangements (See
Exhibit). Regarding financial statement
reliability, the intentional misstatements measure was also significantly
different across groups, but the unintentional misstatements response was
only marginally significant. Finally, loan
acceptance rates varied greatly.
These overall results indicate that
loan officers substantially adjust their
perceptions of auditor independence,
the reliability of the financial state
ments, and the loan decision according
to whether the external auditor performed the outsourced internal audit
function. The findings also indicate that
APRIL 2002 /THE CPAJOURNAI,

hibit auditors from engaging in such
activities.
Staffing of the engagement. The
survey considered two t\ pes of staffing
arrangements within the (.PA firm:
using different personnel or using the
same personnel for external and internal audits. The data shown in the
Exhibit indicate that these two staffing
arrangements were perceived quite differently. Overall, the different personnel group had the highest rating of
auditor independence (7.39) and confidence that the financial statements
were free from unintentional and intentional misstatement (7.30 and 8.39) of
all the groups examined. The loangranting percentage of the different
personnel group (70%) was marginally
significantly higher (p<.06) than the
same personnel group (45%), and considerably higher than the management
functions group.
These results indicate that loan officers view the separation of personnel
performing the external and internal
audit very positively. Respondents had
a more positive perception of auditor
independence, financial statement

EXHIBIT
THE EFFECTS OF OUTSOURCING THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION
TO THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR (MEAN RESPONSES TO CASE QUESTIONS)

Group

Auditor
Independence

Not outsourced (no)
Outsourced—management
functions (mgf)
Outsourced—same
personnel (sp)
0 utsou reed—d iff erent
personnel (dp)
Significance
Levels
Significant Differences

Financial Statement
Reliability
Unintentional Intentional

Loan
Decisions

7.00
5.56

6.54
5.93

7.09
6.48

50%
20%

6.23

6.24

7.24

45%

7.39

7.30

8.39

70%

.001

no>mgf*
dp>mgf,sp*
no>sp**

.100

none

.008

.021

dp> no,mgf,sp* no,dp>
mgf*
dp>sp**

Scores measured on an 11-point scale from 0 (no confidence) to 10 (extreme
confidence). Loan decisions measured as a percentage of loan officers that
would grant the loan.
*Significantly different at the 0.05 level.
* *Significantly different at the 0.1 level.

One way to resolve independence perception problems may be to require the
separation of personnel performing tbe
external and internal audit tasks.
integrity, and loan acceptability when
the external audit firm performed
internal audit work but with different
personnel.
Implicaifons

The results of this study provide
important insights into the effects of
various internal audit outsourcing
arrangements. The findings support the
former AICPA position that having outsourced internal audit activities performed by the company's external
audit firm does not, by itself, appear to
negatively affect financial statement
users' perceptions of auditor independence and other related decisions. This
type of outsourcing arrangement
would be expected to increase in the
future if atidit firms are allowed to provide these services to their clients.
Wliile the SEC and AICPA have implemented certain constraints regarding
these arrangements, in certain cases
audit firms are still allowed to provide
these services.
Our results also support the AICPA's
current position in Interpretation 10113 that if CPAs are associated with an
audit client's internal audit activities
they should not perform management
ftinetions for such a client. Our results
indicate that having external auditors
perform management functions as part
of the outsourced internal audit work
led to the most negative perceptions of
auditor independence and financial
statement reliability, as well as the lowest loan acceptance rates. Financial
statement users perceived that it was
inappropriate for the external auditors
to both supervise the internal audit
function and make decisions regarding
the implementation of systems
improvements (i.e., management functions).
The results provide support for
internal audit outsourcing if there is a

requirement that CPA firm engagement teams providing internal and
external audits remain distinctly separated. The separation of internal and
external audit personnel within the
CPA firm not only minimized potential
independence concerns, but it also
resulted in the most favorable perceptions of auditor independence and
financial statement reliability, and the
highest loan acceptance rates. Apparently, respondents looked favorably
upon the external auditor as a
provider of the outsourced internal
audit as long as the same personnel did
not perform both internal and external
audit functions.
These financial statement users may
have perceived some positive synergy
in performing internal audit work for
the external audit client. This dual role
might improve audit quality by providing external auditors with greater
insight into the client, making it more
likely that business transactions will
be understood and key audit risks
identified. In addition, being engaged
to perform internal audit work for the
audit client may be perceived as a signal of high quality work. Regardless of
whether performing the internal audit
work leads to a better external audit,
or performing the external audit well
leads to an internal audit engagement,
the loan officers in our study perceived this relationship favorably.
While the AICPA has requested (and
the SEC originally proposed) that CPA
firms should be strictly prohibited
from performing outsourced internal
audits for public attest clients, this
study suggests that external auditors
performing outsourced internal audit
work for clients was not, by itself, perceived negatively. The results also
indicate that one way to resolve independence perception problems associated with performing internal audit

work may be to require the separation
of CPA firm personnel performing the
external and internal audit tasks.
These findings should be of interest to
the AICPA, SEC, and other groups
involved with establishing standards
and regulations. These results, along
with additional research, should aid
the development of practice standards
and a conceptual framework for auditor independence.
These results should be interpreted
within the framework of this study and
its inherent limitations. This study
assessed only those situations where
the external auditor was performing
internal audit work. Auditors often
extend their typical financial statement
audit work at the client's request for
other situations, such as performing a
more detailed investigation of one
operating unit or geographic location,
or the expansion of computer operations and processing testing. These and
other situations extend the scope of
the external audit and make using separate teams impractical. Which of these
services constitute external audit work
and w^hich are internal audit work is
sometimes difficult to determine with
certainty and often requires considerable judgment on the part of the auditor. This study did not assess these
hybrid services, even though their categorizations are now required under the
new SEC audit fee disclosure requirements.
•
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